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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates   whether firms with strong corporate governance 
perceive non-audit services (NAS) as a threat to auditor independence or 
as a mechanism to improve audit quality. The sample consisted of 706 firms 
listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2014 and employed six proxies for corporate 
governance. The findings show that firms with a bigger audit committee 
and a higher proportion of independent members in the audit committee are 
linked with higher NAS, consistent with the resource-based view. The study 
also found that audit firms in the Big 4 were paid a higher amount of NAS 
compared to non-Big 4 firms., in line with the general view that the Big 4 
auditors supply higher quality services than the non-Big 4. However, it was 
also found that a more independent board of directors is associated with a 
low NAS. This suggests that although the board of directors might perceive 
NAS a threat to auditor independence, a strong audit committee subscribes 
to the argument that the benefits outweigh the costs. This study contributes 
to the present literature on the determinants of NAS in an emerging market 
and would be informative to regulators worldwide when considering new 
policies related to NAS.
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INTRODUCTION
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) has been a contentious 
issue worldwide since the Enron debacle in 2002. In the United States, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was imposed to restore confidence in the capital market 
where new regulations specify the scope of NAS to clients by auditors and 
stipulate the annual disclosure of audit fees and NAS fees. The U.S. judicial 
authorities believe that the offering of NAS hampers the independence of 
auditors1. In the Malaysian context, various corporate scandals such as in 
the Maxbiz Corp Bhd, Transmile Bhd, and most recently 1MDB have given 
a negative view of the role of auditors in preventing fraud (Wahab, Gist, 
and Majid, 2014)2. In order to ensure the independence of auditors and to 
protect the intrests  of investors, various initiatives have been taken. The 
revised 2002 Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) by-laws provide the 
ethical rules and guidelines pertaining to providing NAS to audit clients3. 
These rules permit auditors to provide NAS to audit clients at a level that 
might not be deemed to compromise independence. Further, the revised 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 stresses that ‘the 
independence of external auditors can be impaired by the provision of NAS 
to the firm’ (Securities Commission, 2002, p.19). As a proactive measure, 
the revised MCCG 2012 underlines that audit committees should establish 
policies governing the circumstances under which contracts for the provision 
of NAS can be entered into and procedures that must be followed by the 
external auditor4. To ensure that independent behaviour is being exercised 
by the auditor while performing an audit, a written assurance in accordance 
with terms that are relevant to the professionmust be obtained5. 
1 In 2001, Arthur Andersen charged Enron US$25 million for auditing services and $27 million for 
non-audit services.
2 The Maxbiz Corp Bhd., Transmile Bhd., Megan Media Holdings Bhd. and Tat Sang Bhd. cases 
signaled accounting irregularities in Malaysia in 2007 and had tarnished auditor reputation. The 
auditor of Transmile Bhd., Deloitte & Touche, was accused of failure in detecting accounting 
irregularities dating back to 2004, after a special audit was performed by Moores Rowland Risk 
Management. The most recent scandal 1MDB has spurred criminal and regulatory investigations 
around the world. The Malaysian parliamentary committee identified at least $4.2 billion in irregular 
transactions related to 1MDB (Bloomberg news - 24 May 2018).
3 Refer to paragraph 290.156-290.161 MIA By-laws.
4 The compliance with best practice as reccommended in the MCCG is voluntary, but public listed 
firms are required to state in their annual reports the extent to which they have complied with best 
practices, and the reasons for any non-compliance.
5 The written assurance should state that the external auditor maintains independence during their 
audit tasks. This essential requirement by MCCG 2012 provides support for the assessment of the 
external auditor’s independence.
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Despite the regulatory concerns on the impairment of auditor 
independence due to the economic bond that is created between the auditor 
and the client (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), empirical studies have found 
mixed arguments and evidence. A recent evidence by Kowalesky, Mayhew, 
and Tegeler (2018) found that providing consulting services increases 
auditor cooperation with managers, increasing audit quality when managers 
prefer high audit quality and decreasing audit quality when managers prefer 
low audit quality. This supports the argument that when the NAS fees are 
too high, auditors are likely to acquiesce to clientsand hence lose their 
independence. On the other hand, the opponents of NAS argue that NAS 
would lead to a high audit quality as a result of knowledge spillover and 
reputational effects (Simunic, 1984). Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) 
found that high NAS fees have negative effects on audit quality which is 
measured by earnings management. Similar conclusions were also found 
in Krishnan, Sami and Zhang (2005) and Francis and Ke (2006) when 
examining pre-SOX period, where audit quality is low in the case of firms 
with high NAS fees. Lim and Tan (2008) also found high NAS fees to be 
associated with low audit quality proxied by low propensity to issue a going 
concern opinion, low propensity to miss analysts’ forecasts, as well as low 
earnings response coefficients6. However, it is important to note that the 
negative effects of NAS on audit quality have not been consistently supported 
by the available evidence (e.g., DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 
2002; Callaghan, Parkash, and Singhal, 2009; Garcia-Blandon, Argiles-
Bosch, Castillo-Merino, Martinez-Blasco, 2017; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and 
Mayhew, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; 
and Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor, 2006). 
Given controversial issues surrounding the NAS, this study examined 
how corporate governance affects NAS in an emerging market. We posit 
that if NAS constitutes serious threats to auditor independence, firms 
with strong corporate governance would minimise or avoid appointing 
an incumbent auditor for the non-audit work. In Malaysia, corporate 
governance has undergone few reforms since the introduction of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in the year 2000 especially those 
relating to the effectiveness of the board and audit committees which aim to 
improve financial reporting and audit quality. We employed six corporate 
governance proxies namely, audit committee independence, the frequency 
6 Lim and Tan (2008) focus on mitigating effect of auditor specialization on NAS and audit quality 
relationship. 
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of audit committee meeting, audit committee size, CEO duality, board 
independence, and auditor size. Our sample covered 706 firms listed in 
Bursa Malaysia focusing on 2014, that is two years after the revised 2012 
MCCG was launched. 
Our findings show that in general, firms with strong corporate 
governance, particularly bigger audit committee, more independent 
members of the audit committee and Big 4 audit firms, were associated 
with high non-audit fees. These findings show that firms with a strong audit 
committee and high-quality auditors place greater emphasis on the benefits 
of NAS on auditing and financial reporting rather than its threat on auditor 
independence. In contrast, the study found that board independence had a 
negative association with NAS. This shows that the board in general, view 
that NAS may have a negative impact on the independence of auditors. 
However, the audit committee, which is ultimately responsible for the the 
quality of an audit and review of any NAS provided by independent auditors, 
subscribes to the arguments that NAS brings benefits such as strengthening 
audit quality due to knowledge spillovers (Wang and Hay, 2013; Jenkins 
and Krawczyk, 2001) and better reputational effect (Ernst & Young, 2013; 
Wang and Hay, 2013). Hence, the regulators’ concern of incumbent auditors 
providing NAS seems to be unwarranted in this specific context. 
For a sensitivity analysis test, we performed the binary logistic 
regression where the results support our main findings. We found that 
firms that purchase NAS have a higher proportion of independent audit 
committee members and a lower proportion of independent directors on 
the board compared to firms that do not purchase any NAS. The result also 
shows that Big 4 auditors are more likely to obtain NAS jobs compared to 
non-Big 4 auditors. 
This study makes the following contributions. First, prior studies were 
mostly concerned on the implications of NAS on audit quality (e.g. DeFond 
et al., 2002; Callaghan et al., 2009), but evidence on corporate governance 
and its relationship to NAS remains scarce. Second, our study adds to a 
stream of research on the perception of the board of directors, particularly 
the audit committee, on how they view the effect of NAS on incumbent 
auditors, especially in an environment where concerted efforts by regulatory 
bodies are in place. Third, as most of the studies focus primarily on the 
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United States and developed countries, our study adds more evidence to the 
research in this stream by investigating the effect of corporate governance 
and NAS in an emerging market.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section 
reviews the literature nd develops the hypotheses. This is followed by the 
discussion on the research design and sample selection procedures. The 
paper then reports the findings, conclusions and limitations.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
Extant studies on NAS have mainly focused on its effects on the quality of 
audit and financial statements (e.g. Park, Choi, and Cheung, 2017; Bamahros 
and Wan-Hussin, 2015; Ruddock et al., 2006; DeFond et al., 2002). Most 
of these studies argue that NAS contributes to the lack of independence 
of external auditors, and thus becomes one of the key factors in a series of 
financial scandals. 
There are two different underpinning theories on how NAS could be 
linked to the quality of financial reporting. NAS may be associated with 
more auditor expertise on the one side and a possible decrease in auditor 
independence on the other side, which can be referred to as the resource-
based view and the principal-agent theory (Velte and Loy, 2018). 
According to the resource-based view, NAS provides companies 
with wider economic benefits due to economy of scopethat arises from the 
joint provision of an audit and NAS. These economy of scope  is normally 
characterised as knowledge spillovers (DeAngelo, 1981). Knowledge 
spillovers are exchanges of information or ideas between two or more 
parties which may facilitate the exchange of ideas, promoting creativity and 
innovation. In the auditing context, knowledge externalities or spillovers 
would arise from interdependencies or interactions in the production of the 
two services, namely, the statutory audit and NAS (Simunic, 1984). Based 
on Demirkan and Demirkan (2017), knowledge generated while performing 
NAS can spill over into an audit, producing economic rents and reducing 
audit costs. Knowledge spillovers could result in more efficient audits as 
auditors have a better understanding of the client’s operations.
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On the other hand, the proponents of the Principal-agent Theory (e.g. 
Beck, Frecka, and Solomon, 1988; Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 1984) argue 
that NAS may lead to incremental economic rents that are beyond the realm 
spillover effects. Bortolon, Neto, and Santos (2013) explain that NAS may 
compromise auditor independence in two ways. First, there is a risk that 
the auditor becomes financially dependent on the client, fearing the loss of 
revenue, and avoids giving negative opinions. Therefore, the willingness 
to report any material misstatement may also be impaired Second, the 
provision of consultancy services can place auditors in a position similar 
to that of managers, which will compromise their judgment. Thus, the 
ability of the auditors to detect a material misstatement will deteriorate. 
Auditors are reluctant to report on the finding to the management due to 
non-audit fees that they have received (Beck et al., 1988). Velte and Loy 
(2018) highlighted that there is also the possibility of a moral hazard if 
the auditor and management collaborate. In such a case, the auditor might 
tolerate faulty financial accounting and grant an unqualified audit opinion 
in exchange for the benefits of receiving contracts for NAS.
Based on this two contradicting theories, this study examined how 
firms with strong corporate governance view NAS. We first focussed on 
the audit committee, which is central for corporate governance. The audit 
committee is responsible for ensuring that financial statements comply 
with applicable financial reporting standards and establishing policies and 
procedures to assess the suitability and independence of external auditors. 
The MCCG 2012 requires audit committees to establish policies governing 
the circumstances under which contracts for the provision of NAS can 
be entered into and procedures that must be followed by the external 
auditors. We employed three proxies namely audit committee size, audit 
committee independence and the frequency of audit committee meetings. 
In addition, we also included other corporate governance proxies such as 
board independence, CEO duality, and Big 4 auditors.
Size of the Audit Committee and Non-Audit Services
A large number of studies have employed audit committee size as a 
proxy for corporate governance (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bedard, 
Chtourou, and Corteau, 2004; Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2009; Li, 
Mangena, and Pike, 2012). Most of the studies tried to examine the effect 
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of audit committee size on financial reporting quality. Based on economic-
related theories, Lipton and Lorsh (1992) and Cornett et al., (2009) argued 
that bigger groups would have an advantage from individual members’ 
expertise, ideas and manpower, and hence  enhance the monitoring and 
group performance. Further, Bedard et al. (2004) argued that larger audit 
committees are more likely to reduce potential problems in financial 
reporting processes because of increased monitoring capacity (Li et al., 
2012). 
The empirical evidence pertaining to the effect of audit committee 
size is however mixed (Bedard et al., 2004; Cornett et al., 2009; Li et al., 
2012). Several studies have documented a positive association between 
audit committee size and the quality of financial reporting (Cornett et al., 
2009; Lin and Hwang, 2010) and non-financial reporting (Li et al., 2012; 
Ahmed Haji, 2015). In Malaysia, Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) 
provide weak evidence that audit committee size is positively associated 
with the quality of financial information disclosure, proxied by the accuracy 
of initial public offering management earnings forecast. This is supported 
by Wan Ismail, Raja Ahmad, Kamarudin, and Yahaya (2009), who found 
that a larger audit committee has more resources and capabilities, and thus 
is better in performing the required duties. 
However, most of the studies reviewed by Bedard and Gendron (2010) 
indicate that the size of the audit committee is not an important determinant 
of effectiveness, and they caution that the incremental costs of poorer 
communication, coordination, involvement and decision making associated 
with a larger audit committee might outweigh the benefits. According to John 
and Serbet (1998), larger committees could be associated with dispersed 
opinions and lack of quick decision-making potentially undermining their 
effectiveness. This also could be due to the problem of free riders that may 
emerge when the number of audit committee members increases, where 
the members may be comforted by the presence of others (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Given the competing theoretical views and mixed empirical 
evidence, as well as lack of prior studies that specifically examined the role 
of audit committee independence in NAS, this study tested the hypothesis 
that there is an association between audit committee size and NAS.
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Audit Committees Independence and Non-Audit Services
Audit committee independence is a central characteristic of good 
corporate governance as discussed in both the academic research, as well 
as regulatory requirements (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2003). In Malaysia, 
the revised MCCG 2012 requires audit committees to comprise only of 
independent directors. A more independent audit committee avoids any 
personal interest since the independent audit committee members do not 
have any personal interest similar to the managers or shareholders, hence 
leading  to a more objective decision. The socio-political theories contend 
that the existence of independent directors in audit committees is symbolic 
with aims for organisational legitimacy (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, 
and Neal, 2009). 
There is much evidence showing the importance of audit committee 
independence in establishing good governance such as in selection of 
external auditors (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001), reducing fraudulent reporting 
practices (Abbott, Parker, Peters, and Raghunandan, 2003; Bedard et al., 
2004), and enhancing financial reporting quality and credibility (Li et 
al., 2012); García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Lin and Hwang, 
2010). Chen, Moroney, and Houghton (2005), for instance, found that an 
independent audit committee has a greater tendency to appoint industry 
specialist auditors. Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) found that audit 
committee independence is negatively limited with the probability of firms 
dismissing auditors following a changing an audit opinion or disputes. 
Further, Carcello and Neal (2003) showed that the independence of the 
audit committee is negatively associated with the likelihood of auditor 
appointment following a “going concern report.” The meta-analyses also 
show that audit committees are significantly related to lower earnings 
management (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Lin and Hwang, 
2010)
With regard to auditor-client relationship, an independent audit 
committee is more confident with financial reports audited by external 
auditors (Abbott and Parker, 2000) and appreciate the external auditor’s 
position (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Moreover, independent directors 
have strong incentives to scrutinize managerial decisions with regard to 
the provision of NAS in order to reduce the potential threat to auditors’ 
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reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2003). In this study, we posit that external 
auditors who also provide NAS would have greater incentives to supply 
high-quality audits and would be able to improve their services more 
effectively. In addition, as the committee may bear higher director liability 
and litigation risks, we predict that NAS will be employed as a mechanism to 
improve audit quality. Thus, the second hypothesis is that there is a positive 
relationship between audit committee independence and NAS.
Audit Committee Meetings and Non-Audit Services
The frequency of audit committee meetings signals the commitment 
of the members to fulfill responsibilities (Abbott et al., 2003). Prior studies 
claim that  more frequent audit committee meetings indicate committee 
activeness and by extension effectiveness (Abbott et al., 2000; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). Audit committees which meet regularly shall have 
enough time to carry out their roles and functions effectively (Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). Raghunandan, Rama, and Scarbrough (1998) argue that 
by meeting frequently, the audit committee will remain informed and be 
knowledgeable about accounting or auditing issues and can direct internal 
and external audit resources to address the matter in a timely fashion. During 
the audit committee meeting the problems encountered in the financial 
reporting process are identified, but if the frequency of the meetings is low 
the problems may not be rectified and resolved within a short period of time. 
Many studies have documented a significant positive association 
between financial reporting quality and audit committee meetings (Abbott 
et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Abbott et al. (2003) examined 
whether audit committee characteristics are associated with NAS. Their 
findings suggest that audit committees that are independent and meet at 
least four times a year purchase less NAS from the auditor. In another study, 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) showed a positive association between 
the number of audit committee meetings and a higher audit quality. Abbott 
and Parker (2000) examined the relationship between the frequency of 
audit committee meetings and auditor’s industry specialisation. Indeed, 
they found that the number of audit committee meetings is associated with 
increases in the choice of a better-quality audit firm. Studies have also shown 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings has a significant impact on 
non-financial disclosures (Li et al., 2012; Ahmed Haji, 2015). However, 
there are also studies that found no association between audit committee 
meetings and reporting quality (Bedard et al., 2004). 
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Little is known about the impact of audit committee meetings on 
NAS. We argue that audit committees that meet more often are more likely 
to perceive NAS as an important mechanism to improve audit quality 
and financial reporting or they might also perceive NAS as a potential 
threat to auditor independence. Given the conflicting theoretical views 
and mixed empirical findings, we developed a competing hypothesis to 
predict the association between audit committee meetings and NAS. Thus, 
we hypothesized that a firm that has a higher number of audit committee 
meetings is associated with higher NAS.
Board Independence and Non-Audit Services
A company’s board of directors is viewed as one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms that is very important to monitor management’s 
corporate decisions and safeguard shareholders’ intrests. Independent 
directors are basically more preferable as they could increase the 
effectiveness of the board monitoring function and ensure that high-quality 
earnings are reported in the financial statements. 
Extant studies on corporate governance support the view that a more 
independent board would perform a better monitoring function, which 
would consequently result in a higher level of earning. For example, higher 
independenceof the board of directors is found to be associated with earnings 
informativeness (Petra, 2007), lower earnings management (Gul, Fung, 
and Jaggi, 2009; Niu, 2006; Klein, 2002), and lower abnormal accruals 
(Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005).
A study by Larcker and Richardson (2004) found that a lower 
percentage of independent members of the board is related to a higher NAS. 
This is consistent with the view that a more independent board of directors 
prefers a lower NAS, due to the fear that high fees paid for NAS could 
impair the independence of the external auditor and the quality of their 
statutory audit. Therefore, a more independent board of directors would limit 
the company’s purchase of NAS. On the other hand, Adelopo and Jallow 
(2008) found that board independence is positively associated with audit 
and non-audit fees paid to the auditor. They argue that this could be due to 
the reason that an independent board plays a crucial oversight function on 
the management and hence an independent board likely to purchase more 
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services from the external auditor to signal a board’s competence and the 
quality of the audit. 
Thus, this study also testedthe hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between board independence and NAS.
CEO Duality and Non-Audit Services
The dual CEO and chairperson roles held by a single person or 
known as CEO duality is one of the most controversial issues in corporate 
governance. Those against CEO duality belief that the CEO and chairperson 
should be separated, consistent with the agency theory. CEO duality would 
enhance CEO entrenchment and impair board independence (Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994; Rhoades, Eisenberger, and Armel, 2001). Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni (1994) contend that CEO entrenchment occurs when managers 
obtain so much power that they are able to use the firm for their own interests 
rather than those of shareholders, rendering the board ineffective. When a 
single person holds both roles, it indicates a sign of a dominant CEO where 
internal monitoring and control mechanism is compromised (Kholief, 2008). 
Further, Dalton and Dalton (2005) assert that separating the roles of CEO 
and COB potentially leads to confusion and lack of clarity, both internally 
with employees and externally with other stakeholders. 
In contrary, there are also arguments that the benefits of CEO duality 
outweigh the negative aspects. According to the stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Clarke, 2007), CEO duality reduces 
concerns regarding accountability since the confidence was given to 
agents to act in the best interests of all relevant parties involved, including 
principals. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) also argued that a unity of 
command enables dual CEOs to act quickly and decisively. In the event of 
strong external threats such as hostile takeovers, the survival of the firm 
demands the centralization of power and tightened controls (Alvarez and 
Svejenova, 2005).
Empirical evidence on the effects of CEO duality on firm’s performance 
and financial reporting are still mixed and inconclusive (see, for example, 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998; Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005). 
Some prior empirical tests support the separation of the roles of the CEO and 
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chairperson (Chen, Lin, and Yi, 2008), while others suggest that combining 
these two roles is preferable (Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001). In the 
Malaysian context, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012) 
recommends firms to split the function between CEO and chairperson. 
This is because the duality role of CEO could result in higher agency 
costs. According to Parkash and Venable (1993) and Firth (1997), firms 
with higher agency costs are expected to require higher audit quality to 
reassure investors and creditors about the integrity of financial statement 
information, and hence limit their purchase of NAS from their incumbent 
auditor. Thus, this study hypothesised that there is a relationship between 
CEO duality and NAS.
Big 4 Auditor and Non-Audit Services
Velte and Loy (2018) highlighted that big audit firms are connected 
with a higher independence in appearance and have a better potential to 
offer a range of additional services. Big 4 firms have more resources that 
lead to a more efficient information system, personal training and quality 
control systems that enable more effective learning processes. Therefore, Big 
4 clients have more potential to subscribe toNAS offered by their auditors. 
Dey, Robin, and Tessoni (2012) suggest that the Big 4 accounting 
firms may be tempted to shed their audit clients by providing them with 
consulting services. This is because it is more profitable than having 
statutory audit engagements. Goldwasser and Morris (2002) also argue that 
by providing NAS, Big 4 auditors can enhance the income of their audit 
firms and improve their viability in the accounting industry and relieve price 
competition for audit services. Additionally, Big 4 firms usually promote 
the idea that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals can 
improve the quality of audit engagements that utilize these consultants as 
specialists. Big 4 firms also can assign personnel from their consulting 
practices to act as specialists in their audit engagement teams. For example, 
in its 2013 audit quality report, Deloitte states that ‘the utilisation of its 
financial advisory, tax, and consulting professions as specialists on audit 
engagements is an indispensable asset that contributes to the quality of their 
audits’. An empirical study by Abbott et al. (2003) also found the evidence 
that the non-audit fees to total audit fees ratios are higher for larger firms 
and for clients of Big 4 auditors.
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On the other hand, for non-big 4 audit firms, the number of industry 
experts and specialist are limited. These small audit firms also have restricted 
ability and resources. Thus, they may not be able to provide NAS, e.g. 
consultation, especially to the large multinational corporations, in which 
global resources are needed to deal with the complex business and financial 
reporting environments. With that, this study testedthe hypothesis that there 
is a positive relationship between NAS and the Big 4 auditors.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
To investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
NAS, this study used a sample of Malaysian publicly traded firms from 
Bursa Malaysia in 2014. The initial sample consisted of 814 firms. We 
extracted the accounting data from the Thomson Reuters database, while 
the data for non-audit service fees, audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, the frequency of audit committee meeting, CEO duality 
and Big 4 auditors were collected directly from the firms’ corporate annual 
reports7. We then removed all missing data to construct related variables. 
Finally, to mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorised the observations 
that fell  in the top and bottom 0.5 percent of the continuous variables (Wan 
Ismail, Kamarudin, and Sarman, 2015). These procedures left us with a 
final sample of 706 firms.
7 The Thomson Reuters database was accessed at Universiti Teknologi Mara, Malaysia.
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Regression Model 
Following previous studies (e.g. Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and 
Riley, 2002), this study used the OLS multivariable linear regression to 
examine the association between explanatory variables and fees for NAS. 
The regression model is as follows:
NAS = β
0
 + β
1 ACSIZE+ β2 ACIND + β3 ACMEET + β14CEODUAL 
	 	 +	β5	BODIND	+	β6 BIG4 + β7 SIZE +β8 PROFIT	+	β9 LEV 
  + β
10 GROWTH + β11-20 Industry	Effects	+	ε (1)
ACSIZE is the number of members of the audit committee; ACIND 
is the percentage of independent directors to the total number of audit 
committee members; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meetings 
held during the financial year; CEODUAL is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the chairman is also the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise; BODIND is 
the proportion of independent directors over the total board size; BIG4 takes 
value 1 if firms are audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural log of 
total assets; PROFIT is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) deflated 
by total assets; LEV is the proportion of total debt to total assets; GROWTH 
is the percentage change in current year sales compared with the previous 
year; Industry effects are dummy variables for industry that takes value 
1 for consumer products, finance, hotels, industrial products, plantation, 
infrastructure project corporation, properties, real estate investment trusts, 
trading and services, and technology respectively, otherwise 0
We included several control variables. First, firm size (SIZE), measured 
using the natural log of total assets, was included because large firms have 
a higher need for consultancy and therefore purchase higher amounts of 
NAS and therefore an assumption of a positive correlation between size 
and NAS fee exists (Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Hay et al., 2006, p. 158). 
Zaman, Hudaib, and Haniffa (2011) found that larger clients are more likely 
to purchase higher levels of NAS due to the complexity of their operations 
and as a means of ensuring a high-quality audits. Second, firm profitability 
(PROFIT) is found to have a positive association with the levels of the NAS 
fee ratio (Parkash and Venable, 1993). Third, leverage (LEV), measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets, has a positive link to agency costs 
thereby auditors become more concerned about their reputational capital and 
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purchase less NAS (Taufil-Mohd, Md-Rus, and Mussalam, 2013; Parkash 
and Venable, 1993). Fourth, we included growth (GROWTH), measured as 
the percentage change in current year sales compared with the previous year, 
where we expect a positive relationship between NAS fee ratio and Growth 
since firms with high growth opportunities are likely to purchase more NAS 
because of rapid expansion in activities and a fast-changing environment 
might stretch senior executives’ abilities to manage, therefore requiring a 
firm to hire more consultants (Firth, 1997). Finally, we included dummy 
variables for the industry to measure the fixed effect of the industry to ensure 
the robustness of the result (Kamarudin, Wan Ismail, and Alwi, 2014).
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the variables are illustrated in Table 1. 
Panel A Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the continuous variables, 
while Panel B reports the dichotomous variables. 
The results reported in Panel A show that the average payment of NAS 
is RM 0.267 million with a standard deviation of RM2.684. The payment 
of NAS ranged from a minimum of RM0 to a maximum of RM67 millions, 
indicating that the sample consists of a top-level firm that is able to pay 
such a high NAS. On the other hand, the average for natural log of NAS 
(LNAS) was 8.776 with a standard deviation of 4.170. For audit committee 
size (ACSIZE), the results show that the mean was 3.358 with the minimum 
size of the audit committee of two members and the maximum size of 9 
members. While for audit committee independence, Panel 1 shows that a 
mean for ACIND was 0.884 showing that the audit committee is dominated 
by independent directors. However, this scenario still showedhat not all 
publicly listed firms in Malaysia comply with the recommendation of revised 
MACC 2012 which suggests that all audit committee members should be 
independent. The results denote that in average the audit committee met4.97 
times during the year, with a range between 1 to 15 meetings, which is higher 
than recommendation set out in the MCCG where the audit committee 
should meet at least four times per year. The mean for BODIND was at 
0.477, indicating that the majority members of the board of directors are 
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internal members, while outsiders only comprised 47.7 percent which can 
still be considered high. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
NAS(million) 0.000 67.000 0.267 2.684
LNAS 0.00 18.02 8.776 4.170
ACSIZE 2.000 9.000 3.358 0.705
ACIND 0.220 1.000 0.884 0.156
ACMEET 1.000 15.000 4.970 1.259
BODIND 0.140 1.000 0.477 0.130
SIZE 6.869 11.806 8.731 0.712
PROFIT -3.963 3.159 0.128 0.322
LEV 0.00 6.591 0.201 0.301
GROWTH -1.000 30.765 0.143 1.302
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables
Dummy Variables
Frequency Percentage
Yes (1) No (0) Total Yes (1) No (0) Total
NASDUM 591 115 706 83.71 16.29 100.00
BIG4 372 334 706 52.69 47.31 100.00
CEODUM 411 295 706 58.20 41.80 100.00
Variable definitions: NAS is the amount of non-audit servies paid to 
incumbent auditor suring the year; LNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS 
paid during the year; NASDUM is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the the firm higher the incumbent auditor to perform NAS, otherwise 0; 
ACSIZE is the number of members of the audit committee; ACIND is the 
percentage of independent directors to the total number of audit committee 
members;ACMEET is the number of audit committee meetings held during 
the financial year; CEODUAL is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the chairman is also the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise; BODIND is the 
proportion of independent directors over the total board size; BIG4 takes 
value 1 if firms are audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural log of 
total assets; PROFIT is earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) deflated 
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by total assets; LEV is the proportion of total debt to total assets; GROWTH 
is the percentage change in current year sales compared with the previous 
year; IND takes the value 1 for a specific industry, 0 otherwise. CP, FIN, 
HOTELS, INDP, IPC, PLANT, PROP, REITS, T&S, and TECH are dummy 
variables for industry that takes value 1 for consumer product, finance, 
hotels, industrial product, plantation, infrastructure project corporation, 
properties, real estate investment trusts, trading and services, and technology 
respectively, otherwise 0.
For firm size (SIZE), the results showed the mean value for the natural 
logarithm of total assets was 8.731, with a maximum value of 11.806 and 
the minimum value of 6.869. The mean value for PROFIT is 0.128, while 
the maximum value was 3.159 and the minimum value is -3.963. The 
results also showed that the mean value for LEV was 0.201 with a standard 
deviation value of 0.301. For GROWTH, the mean value was 0.143 with 
a range between -1.000 and 30.765.
The results in Panel B Table 1 for NASDUM shows that most of the 
firms (with 83.71% of the total sample) appointed the incumbent auditor 
for NAS where only 16.30% of the firms did not pay NAS. Besides that, the 
result showedthat more than half of the sample with 52.69% appointed Big 4 
auditors and the remaining 47.31% appointed non-Big 4. As for CEODUM, 
it showed that most of the sample (58.20%) didnot comply with the MCCG 
to have a separation between the Chairman and CEO.
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Correlation Matrix
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficient matrix with the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients in the lower diagonal and the Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficients in the upper diagonal.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
ACSIZE ACIND ACMEET CEODUM BODIND
ACSIZE 1.000 -0.159*** 0.014 -0.031 0.098***
ACIND -0.192*** 1.000 0.050 0.027 0.332***
ACMEET -0.014 0.062 1.000 0.065 -0.024
CEODUM -0.026 0.029 0.065 1.000 0.026
BODIND 0.088** 0.315*** -0.013 0.038 1.000
BIG4 0.224*** -0.110*** -0.033 0.003 -0.043
SIZE 0.244*** -0.116*** 0.020 0.083** -0.060
PROFIT 0.147*** -0.120*** 0.017 -0.011 -0.042
LEV 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.069* -0.031
GROWTH -0.022 0.039 0.008 0.048 0.022
BIG4 SIZE PROFIT LEV GROWTH
ACSIZE 0.217*** 0.229*** 0.123*** 0.075** -0.013
ACIND -0.100*** -0.119*** -0.110*** -0.036 -0.003
ACMEET -0.033 0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.011
CEODUM 0.003 0.084** 0.020 0.065 0.022
BODIND -0.041 -0.076** -0.111*** -0.065 -0.106***
BIG4 1.000 0.429*** 0.285*** 0.055 0.083**
SIZE 0.420*** 1.000 0.483*** 0.279*** 0.172***
PROFIT 0.180*** 0.324*** 1.000 -0.143*** 0.316***
LEV 0.045 0.040 -0.111*** 1.000 -0.011
GROWTH 0.056 0.116*** 0.144*** -0.006 1.000
Notes: * and *** represent significance at p<0.10 and <0.01, respectively
Variable definitions: ACSIZE is the number of members of the audit 
committee; ACIND is the percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of audit committee members; ACMEET is the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the financial year; CEODUAL is a dummy 
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variable that takes value 1 if the chairman is also the CEO of the firm, 0 
otherwise; BODIND is the proportion of independent directors over the total 
board size; BIG4 takes value 1 if firms are audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PROFIT is earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) deflated by total assets; LEV is the proportion of total 
debt to total assets; GROWTH is the percentage change in current year 
sales compared with the previous year.
The results showed no serious multi-collinearity problem. The highest 
correlation was between BIG4 and SIZE at 0.420 (Pearson) and 0.429 
(Spearman Rank) which was significant at the 1% level. Whereas, ACIND 
and BODIND hada positive relationship with a significant level of 1% 
for both Pearson= -0.315 and Spearman Rank = -0.332. This shows that a 
company with higher audit committee independence also has more outside 
directors in the board. On the other hand, the result showed that  BIG 4 and 
CSIZE hada negative correlation at the 1% level for Pearson (-0.224) and 
10% level for the Spearman Rank (-0.217) which indicatedthat companies 
that appoint BIG 4 firms tend to have  smaller audit committees. From the 
explanation above, we can summarise that there is no multicollinearity 
problem between the independent variables8.
Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the results from three estimations: basic OLS model, 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted model9 and fixed-effect estimates which control 
for the industry effects10. 
The findings showed that the coefficients for BODIND are negative and significant in all three estimations, showing 
8 Kaplan (1982) suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation between if 
independent variables is 0.90 or above. However, Emory (1982) considered more than 0.80 to be 
problematic.This is further supported by Grewel, Cote and Baumgartner (2004), they had found 
that if the correlation is over 0.8 considered as extreme.
9 Heteroscedasticity problem occurs when the variance of the errors varies across observations. If 
the errors are heteroscedastic, the OLS estimator remains unbiased, but becomes inefficient. More 
importantly, estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent. The estimated standard errors can be 
either too large or too small, in either case resulting in incorrect inferences.
10 This study controlled for serial correlation problems of residuals data by incorporating industry in the 
regression model. By using the Bursa Malaysia’s sector classification, this study creates ten industry 
dummies: Consumer Product (CP); Finance (FIN); Hotels; Industrial Product (IND); Infrastructure 
Project Co. (IPC); Plantation (PLANT); Property (PROP); REITS; Trading and Services (T&S) 
and Technology (TECH). The construction sector is not included in the equation because it is used 
as a base sector to avoid perfect multi-collinearity problem.
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that NAS is lower in firms with more a independent board of directors. 
This is consistent with Bedard and Paquette (2011)that a more independent 
board of directors would not approvea  big amount of NAS fees because it 
would give negative effects on their reputation. Contrary to the expectation, 
the results showed that the coefficients for ACSIZE and ACIND were 
positively significant in all three models, suggesting that firms with a bigger 
audit committee and a higher proportion of independent member of the 
audit committee are linked with higher NAS. Our results are consistent 
with Zaman et al. (2011), who found that NAS has a positive relationship 
with audit committee effectiveness especially for larger clients, probably 
due to the complexity of the business activities. From these results, we 
can posit that, in general, board independence is linked to a lower NAS 
which is consistent with the general concern that NAS might impairauditor 
independence. However, in the context of the audit committee, NAS was 
perceived to bring benefits to firms, such as high audit quality due to the 
knowledge spillover effect. Hence firms with the larger audit committee 
and a high proportion of independent audit committee members would 
pay more NAS fees than other firms. As audit committee members are 
responsible for overseeing financial reporting and related internal controls 
and risks, they have greater incentives to engage incumbent auditors for 
NAS, especially when they have less knowledge about the firm. The MCCG 
2012 also requires audit committees to ensure financial statements comply 
with applicable financial reporting standards. The audit committee hence 
welcomes advice from the experts, particularly external auditors. 
We also found that the coefficients for BIG 4 in all three estimations 
were positively significant at the 1% level, showing that firms with Big 4 
auditors were paid a higher amount of NAS compared to firms with non-Big 
4 auditors. This is consistent with Goldwasser and Morris (2002), which 
found that the Big 4 audit firms are more likely to provide NAS, to enhance 
their income for their audit firms. Meanwhile, the coefficients for CEO 
duality and audit committee meetings were not significant.
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Table 3: Regression Estimates
Ordinary Least 
Square
Heteroscedasticity 
Adjusted
Controlling Industry 
Effects
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. White-t Coeff. t-stat
Intercept -7.170*** -3.205 -7.170*** -3.705 -8.492*** -3.293
ACSIZE 0.395* 1.820 0.395* 1.915 0.373* 1.716
ACIND 2.660*** 2.673 2.660*** 2.597 2.769*** 2.747
ACMEET 0.045 0.374 0.045 0.413 0.006 0.049
CEODUAL -0.289 -0.995 -0.289 -0.991 -0.190 -0.652
BODIND -2.423** -2.063 -2.423** -2.059 -2.860** -2.412
BIG4 1.853*** 5.809 1.853*** 5.969 1.762*** 5.497
SIZE 1.397*** 5.649 1.397*** 6.450 1.550*** 5.669
PROFIT 0.899* 1.882 0.899*** 2.947 0.851* 1.771
LEV 0.417 0.874 0.417 1.186 0.539 1.127
GROWTH -0.028 -0.397 -0.044 -0.394
CP 0.661 0.935
FIN 0.919 0.974
HOTELS 3.388* 1.708
INDP 0.356 0.544
IPC 0.908 0.508
PLANT 0.626 0.726
PROP -0.835 -1.120
REITS -3.432** -2.321
T&S 0.486 0.724
TECH 1.176 1.240
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.18 0.20  
N 706 706 706  
F-stat 16.850 20.036 9.586  
Notes: * and *** represent significance at p<0.10 and <0.01, respectively
Variable definitions: ACSIZE is the number of members of the audit 
committee; ACIND is the percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of audit committee members;ACMEET is the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the financial year; CEODUAL is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the chairman is also the CEO of the firm, 0 
otherwise; BODIND is the proportion of independent directors over the total 
board size; BIG4 takes value 1 if firms are audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PROFIT is earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) deflated by total assets; LEV is the proportion of total debt 
to total assets; GROWTH is the % change in current year sales compared 
with the previous year; CP, FIN, HOTELS, INDP, IPC, PLANT, PROP, 
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REITS, T&S, and TECH are dummy variables for industry that takes value 
1 for consumer product, finance, hotels, industrial product, plantation, 
infrastructure project corporation, properties, real estate investment trusts, 
trading and services, and technology respectively, otherwise 0.
For the control variables, the coefficients for SIZE and PROFIT had 
a significant and positive value suggesting that large and more profitable 
firms tend to purchase NAS. This supports the evidence found by Palmrose 
(1986) and Firth (1997), supporting the arguments that larger firms are more 
likely to have complex systems and a wider range of activities, both of which 
provide greater opportunities for auditors to provide NAS. Further, the 
positive significant relationship between profit and the level of purchasing 
NAS is in line with Parkash and Venable (1993). For growth and leverage, 
no significant association was found.
Robustness Tests
To ensure the robustness of our results, we employed the binary 
logistic regression to determine how much variance is explained on firms’ 
decision to purchase or not to purchase NAS (NASDUM) by corporate 
governance attributes. In the binary logistic regression, we used NASDUM 
as the dependent variable, which took value 1 for a firm with NAS and 0 
for otherwise, while other variables remained. The regression estimates are 
reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Regression Estimates using Binary Logistic Regression
Variable Coeff. Z-stat P-value
Constant -3.265* -1.714 0.086
ACSIZE 0.278 1.333 0.182
ACIND 1.461* 1.942 0.052
ACMEET 0.048 0.455 0.649
CEODUAL -0.198 -0.9 0.368
BODIND -1.905** -2.218 0.027
BIG4 1.016*** 4.056 0.000
SIZE 0.347* 1.683 0.092
PROFIT 0.562 1.414 0.157
LEV 0.074 0.22 0.826
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GROWTH 0.475 1.358 0.174
Pseudo R2 0.09
N 706
LR chi2 58.31
Notes: * and *** represent significance at p<0.10 and <0.01, respectively. 
Variable definitions: ACSIZE is the number of members of the audit 
committee; ACIND is the percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of audit committee members;ACMEET is the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the financial year; CEODUAL is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the chairman is also the CEO of the firm, 0 
otherwise; BODIND is the proportion of independent directors over the total 
board size; BIG4 takes value 1 if firms are audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE is the natural log of total assets; PROFIT is earnings before interests 
and taxes (EBIT) deflated by total assets; LEV is the proportion of total debt 
to total assets; GROWTH is the % change in current year sales compared 
with the previous year;
The results show that the coefficient for ACIND was positively 
significant which was consistent with our main results. The results suggest 
that firms that purchase NAS have a higher proportion of independent audit 
committee members compared to firms that do not purchase any NAS. The 
result also shows that the coefficient for BODIND is negative suggesting that 
firms that purchase NAS are associated with firms with a lower proportion 
of independent directors on the board. We found that the coefficient for BIG 
4 is positively significant (at the 1% level), showing that Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to obtain NAS job compared to non-Big 4 auditors. These 
results support our main findings.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the effect of corporate governance on NAS. Prior 
studies have concentrated on the effect of NAS on audit quality, but the 
results were mixed and inconclusive (e.g. Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; and Larcker and Richardson, 
2004). In line with these findings, our study has documented that NAS is 
lower in firms with  a more independent board of directors, consistent with 
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Bedard and Paquette (2011)’s argument that a more independent board of 
directors would not approve the big amount of NAS fees because it would 
give negative effects on their reputation. More interesting, contrary to 
expectations, our study found that firms with a bigger audit committee and 
a higher proportion of independent members in the audit committee are 
linked with a higher NAS, consistent with Zaman et al. (2011), showing 
a higher demand for NAS probably due to the complexity of the business 
activities, perceived NAS benefits, or heightened responsibility of audit 
committee members in overseeing financial reporting and related internal 
controls and risks. Our results support the view that the accumulation of 
client-specific knowledge, as a result of NAS, could lead to high-quality 
audits and financial reporting. We have added to the existing literature by 
providing evidence on how different proxies for corporate governance 
respond to issues on NAS. The findings of this paper will be of use to 
financial reporting regulatory authorities in Malaysia such as the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia as well as the Malaysian Institute 
of Corporate Governance, regarding the different corporate governance 
roles played by auditors pertaining to NAS. Several limitations that have 
arisen from the data availability need to be considered in this study. Firstly, 
the NAS data reported on the financial statements was limited since there 
were no specific rules or disclosure requirements. Though firms report the 
total amount paid for NAS, disclosure on the nature and scope of NAS are 
limited, so we  were not able to distinguish the decision on different types 
of NAS such as audit-related or tax-related services. Future studies could 
investigate this issue using different methods such as a survey or a case study. 
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